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A PARASITOLOGICAL VIEW OF NON-CONSTRUCTIBLE SETS 
FREDERIK KORTLANDT 
The genetic code, the primary manifestation of life, and, on 
the other hand, language, the universal endowment of human-
ity and its momentous leap from genetics to civilization, are 
the two fundamental stores of information transmissible from 
the ancestry to the progeny, the molecular succession, which 
ensures the transfer of hereditary messages from the cells of 
one generation to the next generation, and the verbal legacy as 
a necessary prerequisite of cultural tradition.
1 
Divergent terminologies direct attention to different pattem-
ings; and finding a logically convincing test, acceptable all 
around, that can determine whether one such system of terms 
is superior to its rivals, is often impossible. Yet the slow proc-
esses of evolution presumably apply to human societies and 
their symbolic systems as much as to human bodies, so that 
when logic cannot decide, survival eventually will.
2 
πάντα ῥεῖ 
As McNeill points out in his remarkable book on the role of infectious disease in 
the history of mankind, “one can properly think of most human lives as caught in 
a precarious equilibrium between the microparasitism of disease organisms and 
the macroparasitism of large-bodied predators, chief among which have been 
other human beings”.
3 This view, which is abundantly illustrated in the book, 
leaves several questions open. 
Firstly, it is noteworthy that man has surpassed other large-bodied predators 
like lions and wolves in his ability to command the environment. What was the 
device that enabled man to achieve higher efficiency in hunting? The obvious an-
swer is: the use of language.  
Secondly, it must be noted that man is curiously insensitive as compared with 
other hunting species. The conjecture that the use of language diminishes the need 
for direct observation does not explain the rapid disappearance of the hunter’s 
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senses. More probably, the faculty of language has an adverse effect on the per-
ceptual capacity of the brain. 
Thirdly, the macroparasitism among human beings differs in kind from the re-
lation between predator and prey. Its function is to shorten the food chain. Even 
cannibalism generally serves a legal purpose and is not merely a way of feeding. 
Human beings are driven by ideas. 
In recent years there has been some debate whether language must be viewed 
primarily as a means of communication or as a form of self-expression of the hu-
man mind. Both of these views start from an anthropocentric conception of lan-
guage. According to the view advanced in the present article, language is the 
means of communicating natural forms of self-expression through the human 
mind. 
The influence of concepts is particularly striking in man’s economic behav-
iour. The following example is typical: 
What had always seemed commonplace and respectable became, after Veblen, fraudulent, 
ridiculous and (a favorite word of his) barbaric. This is high art. The American rich never 
recovered from the sardonic disdain with which Veblen analyzed their behavior. The man-
ners of an entire society were altered as a result. After he made the phrase “conspicuous 
consumption” a part of the language, the real estate market in Newport was never again the 
same. What had been the biggest and best was henceforth the most vulgar. “Conspicuous 
leisure” made it difficult even for the daughters of the rich to relax. Their entertainment had 
thereafter to be legitimatized by charitable, artistic or even intellectual purpose or, at mini-
mum, sexual relief.
4 
It is hard to think of child labour, war, totalitarianism, or massive unemployment 
without the driving force of a system of beliefs in conjunction with a blunted 
sense of perception. The observation that in all Yuman languages the word for 
‘work’ is a loan from Spanish
5 should be a major blow to any current economic 
theory. 
The force of language is indeed comprehensive. “Even in the most primitive 
cultures the strategic word is likely to be more powerful than the direct blow”.
6 
This has little to do with truth or logic because “the normal speaker does not actu-
ally feel the clash which the logician requires”.
7 The view of language as a tool of 
the human species is less well-founded than its converse. The question is, in 
Humpty Dumpty’s words, which is to be master. 
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The relation of a language to its carrier bears a strong resemblance to that of a 
parasite to its host. It invades the left hemisphere, diminishing the perceptual ca-
pacity of the brain. As a result, man’s major capability to change his environment 
is matched by a minor capability to gain insight from direct observation. An ex-
cessive attack may lead to autistic phenomena. If the brain strikes back, it may 
yield a form of epilepsy. Cruelty is a human characteristic because it results from 
the substitution by the linguistic parasite of conception for perception. 
The formalist philosophy of language, of which generative grammar is but the 
latest variety, is futile because its subject matter is more easily accessible to the 
biochemist. The proper subject of the humanities is the behaviour of the linguistic 
parasite. As in the natural sciences, advance in a humanist discipline springs from 
observation of what happens under changing circumstances, not from reflection 
on what is generally known. 
Language differs from viral diseases such as measles or smallpox in two re-
spects. First, it is transmitted through sound waves, not through bodily contact. It 
can therefore be assumed that the fundamental structure of language is much sim-
pler than that of a regular childhood disease. Second, the pattern of mutual adap-
tation between the individual and his language is much more stable than in the 
case of a more virulent infection. The process of adjustment alters not only the 
individual’s behaviour and his language, but also the behaviour of the group and 
the structure of the society at large. The relative ease with which the individual’s 
language responds to a change in the environment and the violent reactions which 
the use of language provokes among larger groups show that language is ancient 
in the individual and unfit for the large-sized communities of modern times. 
The fast rate of change which language exhibits can be compared with the in-
stability of the influenza virus. It exemplifies a type of change which differs quali-
tatively from what we are accustomed to regard as the normal type of biological 
reproduction. In order to clarify the matter I define: 
(1)  Organic reproduction yields an image which resembles the model to a 
large extent. 
(2)  Symbolic reproduction yields an image which resembles the model to a 
small extent. 
Both types of reproduction must be distinguished from physical growth, which 
changes the size of an object without affecting its internal relationships. A crystal 
may grow, but does not reproduce itself. 
Werner Winter once compared the work of a translator with that of an artist 
who is asked to create an exact replica of a marble statue, but who cannot secure 
any marble. This is an apt characterization. Other linguistic activities differ from 
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the feature of symbolic reproduction and involve the creation of objects with un-
foreseen properties. 
Logical analysis requires the identifiability of distinguishable elements as be-
longing to the same set. In the case of an extensional definition, it presupposes a 
sufficient degree of similarity between the indicated and the intended elements. In 
the case of an intensional definition it presupposes the applicability of a criterion, 
which depends on the degree of similarity between the indicated property and the 
perceptible characteristics of the intended objects. The constructibility of a set is 
determined by the identifiability of its elements. 
Language does not generally satisfy the fundamental requirement of logic. 
Consider the following example: 
(3)  Man is numerous. 
(4)  Socrates is a man. 
(5)  Socrates is numerous. 
From a linguistic point of view, the inference is equivalent to the first syllogism of 
traditional logic. The point is that a linguistic meaning thrives by virtue of its ap-
plications, which cannot be deduced from its implications. The latter must be de-
rived from its applicability, rather than the other way round. Thus, a linguistic 
meaning has the properties of a non-constructible set.  
Now I define: 
(6)  Existence is the capacity of an element being distinguished. 
(7)  Truth is the capacity of an element belonging to a set. 
(8)  Meaning is the capacity of being a set. 
(9)  The power of a capacity is the set of elements with that capacity. 
(10) Symbolization is the power of existence. 
(11) Generalization is the power of truth. 
(12) Abstraction is the power of meaning. 
(13) Mathematics is the study of symbolization. 
(14) Logic is the study of generalization. 
(15) Philosophy is the study of abstraction. 
Thus, a mathematician is typically concerned with the problem of existence, a lo-
gician with the problem of truth, and a philosopher with the problem of meaning. 
(16) Physics is the phenomenology of existence. 
(17) Anthropology is the phenomenology of truth. 
(18) Linguistics is the phenomenology of meaning. 
The following statement can easily be verified: 
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– If  x can be distinguished and y can be distinguished, then x and y can be 
distinguished. 
– If  x and y can be distinguished and z can be distinguished, then x can be 
distinguished and y and z can be distinguished. 
–  There is an identity element, viz. nothing, which combines with any dis-
tinguishable element without affecting what is distinguished. 
–  For every distinguishable element x there is an inverse element x
-1, which 
is the absence of x. 
–  There is no proper subset of symbolization such that every distinguish-
able element can be distinguished as an element of the subset. 
–  The number of distinguishable elements is limited by the finite ability of 
the senses. 
(20)  Generalization is the Cartesian product of symbolization and abstraction. 
I further define: 
(21) Sense is the applicability of meaning. 
(22) Formalization is the reduction of meaning to truth. 
(23) A contradiction is an element of generalization which is both true and 
false. 
(24) A confusion is an element of abstraction with a contradictory forma-
lization. 
The existence of non-constructible sets offers a solution for the problem of the 
philosopher’s stone. I think that the philosopher’s stone is a 4-dimensional object 
and that it is crossing the 3-dimensional surface of a 4-dimensional pond called 
history. The universe is the slice of the stone which is at the level of the water. 
The universe originated with a big bang when the stone hit the surface. It is finite 
and expands as the stone sinks into the water. Why did the stone hit the surface? 
We shall never know because it is beyond human observation.  
The parasitological view of non-constructible sets outlined here has important 
consequences for the daily practice of human affairs. Language has enabled hu-
manity time and again to discover new techniques, allowing easy exploitation and 
rapid depletion of hitherto inaccessible resources and thereby renewing or intensi-
fying damage to other forms of life. Its fast rate of change has not permitted a sta-
ble, chronic relationship to establish itself. “A stable new disease pattern can arise 
only when both parties manage to survive their initial encounter and, by suitable 
biological and cultural adjustments, arrive at a mutually tolerable arrangement. 
(...) historical experience of later ages suggests that something like 120 to 150 
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infections”.
8 Language may be lethal if time does not suffice for humans to adjust 
to changing conditions. 
The reason why we have not been able to locate an extra-terrestrial civilization 
is probably that it managed to blow itself to pieces before contact could be estab-
lished: otherwise we would have been blown to pieces ourselves. The survival of 
the human species requires a strong curtailment of resources available for techno-
logical innovation and a large-scale effort to diminish abstraction and to stimulate 
direct observation by the individual.  
[See also 206.] 
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